The article discusses the complex situation of Warsaw Yiddish press during the German occupation of Warsaw (1915-18), entangled in contacts with both the offi cial German authorities as well as representatives of German Jewish milieus (namely, Zionist and Orthodox ones). It is based on press reports from Yiddish and German-Jewish newspapers, archival sources and some personal memoirs. The newspapers taken into account are Haynt, Der Moment, as well as the Germanoriented Varshaver Tageblat and Dos Yudishe Vort.
denominator for the thus-defi ned 'German party', probably the German stereotypes regarding the Ostjuden and the Yiddish language -the views worth some attention -and the will to use the Ostjuden in supporting the Germans in the war would be the one. 6 There were at least two related groups among Polish Jews: the so-called national Jews (commonly referred to as 'Jewish nationalists'), represented by Haynt and Der Moment, and an Orthodox milieu (putting aside the assimilated Jews, who, owing to the language barrier, were not readers of Yiddish/Hebrew-language press, and were not represented by it). It was not long afterwards that the milieus of Haynt and Moment, which usually described themselves as natsyonale yidn or natsyonal-bashtimte yidn supported the Zionist or Folkist movement; their conviction that being a Jew was not only about religion, because nationality came fi rst, was the reason for either cooperation or confl ict when it came to coexist with the German Jews.
I THE VIEWS ON THE OSTJUDEN AND YIDDISH
September 1914 saw an appeal to Polish Jews announced in the German and German-Jewish press, and distributed also as leafl ets, 6 The reference literature is extremely rich; hence, the subject-matter can be discussed herein very much in brief: this essay basically seeks to outline the background for the period's complex contacts between the Germans, German Jews, and Jews in the occupied territory. Cf., in the fi rst place, Steven E. Aschheim, in Yiddish and Hebrew. 7 The phrase 'Muscovite iron yoke' was used; persecutions imposed by Russia, the pogrom and the Beilis trial, were recalled; and, a promise was made: "Our banners shall bring you law and freedom, equal civic rights, freedom of religion, freedom of living without obstacles, in your own spirit, across the domains of economic and social life." 8 The appeal was produced in the milieu of elder-generation German Zionists who perceived the support offered to the Germans -the victorious party, as they believed -as an opportunity for Zionism to meet its goals in the Middle East, by gaining support for the idea of developing a Jewish state in the historical territory of Palestine, then part of the Ottoman Empire. Max Bodenheimer, one of the infl uential leaders of the Zionist movement in Germany, submitted (from the earliest days of the war) to the German authorities memoranda postulating the foundation in the Polish territory of a multiethnic buffer state, which would be allied with Germany and Austria-Hungary. This vision granted a special role to East European Jewry, who were meant to constitute a sort of vanguard of the German authority, a concept founded upon the kinship of the Yiddish and German languages and a shared hatred toward Russia.
Brothers and Strangers. The East European Jew in German and
Since the postulate proposed by the Zionists was welcomed by the authorities, in the middle of August this group, led by Franz Oppenheimer and Max Bodenheimer, founded a 'German Committee for Liberation of the Russian Jews' (Deutsches Komitee zur Befreiung der russischen Juden). The body was equipped with its own propagandist journal Kol Mevaser, whose title explicitly evoked one of the earliest Jewish periodicals in tsarist Russia. 10 The fi rst (and penultimate) issue contained, apart from the aforesaid appeal, an essay by Nahum Sokolow, in Yiddish, clearly opting for the German stance, against 7 
Russia.
11 When it became clear, however, that the war would go on for well longer than a mere few weeks, the Committee was renamed, under the pressure from the World Zionist Organisation into a 'Committee for the East' (Komittee für den Osten; KfdO) 12 -the ideology it advocated remaining unchanged, though.
What is striking in Bodenheimer's reminiscences of a journey he made in autumn 1914 to the headquarters of the Ober-Ost, is a leitmotiv characteristic of many a memoirs of German Jews who fi rst saw some of the Ostjuden by themselves -namely, an astonishment with their peculiar 'oriental' appearance (perceptible at fi rst sight) as well as their number: "After a drive of about three hours we reached Radom, where the picture that presented itself to our view was one altogether new to us. On the long street which traversed the city, a stream of men was meandering about -all in dark kaftans and caps. Among them, at fi rst, we saw few women and girls, but later the picture was colourfully enlivened by the latter. It seemed as if in this city there were only Jews". 13 Elsewhere, Bodenheimer remarks that the Jews he encountered on his way had already heard about the appeal: "They felt a certain pride at being addressed in their language in order to establish friendly relations." 14 The experience of encounter or contact with the exoticism of Eastern Europe caused that the Ostjudenfrage, which became an object of much attention in the public discourse, functioned as a 'sensitive barometer for a Jewish-German self-defi nition' to a larger degree than ever before. 15 This topic was making headlines in the German-Jewish press, particularly in the KfdO organ entitled Neue Jüdische Monatshefte (which was initially meant to be named Ostjüdische Revue 16 ). The frequency of its appearance best testifi es to the mixed feelings 11 associated with the coreligionists from the East. On the one hand, they were perceived with a bit of a thrill, for the misery of the local people reinforced the worst of the Ostjuden stereotypes prevalent in German culture. 17 On the other hand, KfdO's propagandists portrayed East European Jews as, in a sense, Kulturträgers: the Yiddish language and anything related with it was harnessed for the task. Participation in the warfare in the Polish territory implied contact with the traditional Jewish community and its language.
18 For a group of German-Jewish activists, who had by then expressed their disdainful opinions on Yiddish or treated it as a bashful thing, 19 the language was raised to the status of an instrument of promotion of German culture: "The thing is, we were not made aware yet that several millions of Polish and Russian Jews that had fl ed from there to beyond the Ocean were now paving the way for the German language far away in the East and beyond the seas, as long as we do not contribute to annihilating this powerful instrument of [advancing] Germanness abroad." 20 Hence, the KfdO earnestly promoted Yiddish before the German authorities as a mittelhochdeutscher Dialekt. 21 Franz Oppenheimer, the KfdO chairman, described in his memoirs the moment he instructed some that short stories and poems in Yiddish, written down phonetically in the Latin alphabet, be included in one of KfdO's publications, to the enthusiasm of German readers. "A stunning thing, that! His Majesty must see this", one aristocrat commented. 22 Journalistic commentaries regarding the Ostjuden quite frequently mentioned Yiddish press (regrettably, in a rather shallow manner). In his brochure Was sind die Ostjuden? Zur ersten Information, Nathan Birnbaum made the readers realise that "the ever-more-extensive and infl uential Yiddish-language press comes as the achievement of the two recent decades. Warsaw and New York, in particular, have seen the existence of enormous modern enterprises of Yiddish daily newspapers of varied party-related views -from the most passionate socialism, to the most provident conservatism." 24 The KfdO lobbied with the German authorities in favour of the Yiddish press in the occupied territories, arguing that the opportunity to read newspapers in Yiddish would keep the local Jews from reading Polish publications. 25 Yiddish press could seem a good ally to acquire, especially once the plans to establish a Polish state under the auspices of the Reich modifi ed the visions proposed by Bodenheimer and the farreaching goals advocated by the KfdO -the latter had ever since begun lobbying for a national-and-cultural autonomy for the Jews within the Polish territory. It soon turned out, however, that the German civil administration of the Governorate-General (Generalgouvernement) of Warsaw was an important engine to be reckoned with -and one whose interests were not always convergent with those of the exponents of the German Jewry.
II YIDDISH PRESS WITHIN THE GERMAN CENSORSHIP SYSTEM
Historians and memoirists emphasise that on entering Warsaw on 5 August 1915, around seven in the morning, the German troops were welcomed the warmest by the Jewish people:
26 "… the Warsaw public behaved decently by showing calm and cold blood; only our dearest 23 Yids gave a very hot and applausive welcome to the Germans -something we would have expected, actually", Stanisław Dzierzbicki, economist and sociopolitical activist remarked. 27 As it seems, however, this very fact should not be quite surprising, given the experience of the fi rst year of the war: compared against the tsarist army, the disciplined German troops seemed to ensure a respite from persecutions and pogroms (albeit the destruction of Kalisz was broadly covered in the Jewish press 28 ). Before the Germans entered the Polish capital, the Haynt editorial and publishing team met and resolved to reactivate the daily as soon as practicable. 29 The Der Moment team had similar plans. Nehemiah Finkelshtayn of Haynt and Tsevi Pryłucki of Moment met on the same day (5 August), together with other Warsaw-based magazine editors, on invitation of the new city commandant, Count von Arnim, at his offi ce. The host of the meeting remarked that the Germans did not treat Warsaw as an inimical territory, expecting in exchange the local press to respond adequately. In reply to an interpellation from the Jewish editors, the Count reassured that as soon as the fi ghting around Warsaw comes to an end, the Jewish press will regain the freedom to appear in circulation again and will be treated in the same way as the Polish press. On the following meeting, held on 6 August, von Arnim reconfi rmed that the dailies that had been issued for a long time, Jewish ones included, might be issued continually, with the editors remaining personally responsible for the content published until a censorship offi ce is established. As Tsevi Pryłucki remembered, [t] he shelling coming from [the district of] Praga, along the entire section of the Vistula, … made walking in the streets dangerous. Therefore, I found it hard to convoke a few type-setters at the editorial offi ce. There was no-one of the associates present, so I eventually had to work the whole night, in order to get published Der Moment in the morning, on 7 August, after the three weeks of forced silence. … The paper was reissued now, but had no distribution outside Warsaw, since the railway was not in operation and there was no communication with the outer world whatsoever. This being the case, we could only draw the news from the German newspapers sent to us via the army postal service. Thus, we published the communiqués of the German General Staff.
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Haynt issued (probably in the night of 6/7 August) a two-page special supplement, dated 6 August and with continuous page numbering, fi lled with notices of the new authorities and brief reports, neutral in tone, on the subsequent stages of taking over the power in the city. The vignette featured the old-style date, for the last time.
The following issue, published on Sunday, featured a blank spot left of a censorship intervention, right next to an announcement for the press signed by General Reinhard von Scheffer-Boyadel, which warned that publishers, editors and printers will be punished for distributing military news (unless with a special permit), false information or hearsays that might arouse disputes of a social or public, national or ethnic nature. 31 This same issue of Haynt offered the readers an editorial article (the fi rst after a long break) by the Editor-in-Chief, Shmuel Yankev Yatskan, inducing to give the situation due weight, observe judiciousness and foresight. 32 Judging by the reserved tone and the quite cautious choice of the words used, even Yatskana enfant terrible of the Jewish journalism -was impressed by the fi rst moments of the German occupation in Warsaw.
Initially, the Warsaw press was subordinated to the Board of Press under the High Command East; then, once the Governorate-General of Warsaw was established, it reported to the Press Section of the GG's Civil Board (based in Warsaw). The Board as well as the Section was managed by Georg (Jerzy) Cleinow, German publicist, born and educated in the Lublin region. 33 34 In the fi rst days of the occupation, Cleinow invited representatives of Warsaw press to visit his offi ce where he briefed them on the main guidelines of the German policy for Congress Poland, making his expectations pretty clear:
You have to intermediate between the postulates of the fi ghting German army, on the one hand, and the views and wishes of the Polish nation, on the other. I have put trust in you, Gentlemen, to the extent that you shall work together with me in this emollient sense, and it is based upon this trust that we also have abolished the ban on publishing newspapers; thus, you are elected to play a role, and act fully responsibly. Warsaw is the hub of any and all spiritual and nationalistic strivings of the Polish nation. Yet, Warsaw has the largest Jewish community in Europe. All the contradictions existing between the two groups must now fall silent, in the face of the historic events of major importance. As for the Poles, they have to hold back their anti-Semitic inclinations, whilst the Jews shall be barred from raising objections against Poles or denounce them; in a word, a complete ceasefi re, in nationalistic terms, must prevail. 35 Tsevi Pryłucki, chief editor of Der Moment, instantly published a report on the meeting, as he aptly reasoned that for the Jewish people, extremely weary of the war, this would come as a portent of appeasement and reassurance. But Cleinow chastened him harshly for that; as it later appeared, after Pryłucki left the meeting, the attendees were told that the exposé was strictly confi dential. Der Moment was not punished with suspension by intercession of Dr Ludwig Haas, head of the Jewish Department at the Warsaw Generalgouvernement's Civil Board -the main institution the Jewish populace was directly subject to. 35 Cracow, Archiwum Narodowe [hereinafter: ANK], Naczelny Komitet Narodowy, Prezydium (akta), Sekretariat Generalny, 29/530/0/NKN 87: The German occupation in the Kingdom of Poland. Press-censorship relations, l. 30. 36 Steven Aschheim is not the only historian to have observed that Haas, "a man of great personal integrity and political acumen, … was nevertheless quite unsuited Joanna Nalewajko-Kulikov
The other editors, Polish and Jewish alike, who had to do with Cleinow, remembered him afterwards as a man hard to cooperate with, putting it mildly. Yeshaye Uger, Editor-in-Chief with the Lodzer Tageblat, recollected the moment Cleinow demanded from him, in the spring of 1915, that he wrote an article on anti-Semitic riots in Kalisz. Not willing to yield, Uger argued that a large daily, like, for instance, Haynt, would not ever be requested to do such a thing. At that point, Cleinow sought what the Haynt thing actually was; having heard that it was a "newspaper supported by the Jewish society in its entirety", 37 he burst into laughter, asking, "Ah, a Jewish The Times of sorts? Lieber Redakteur, come on!, we apply no 'class' difference: a Times or a Tageblat is one and the same thing for us. We are waging a war, and are inconsiderate to everyone." 38 A few weeks later, Uger was secretly told by a censor -a Jew himself -that Cleinow ordered for a pile of Haynt copies, got a few articles translated for his use, and compiled a 'long and, certainly, unfavourable' report for Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg himself.
Uger, who says he read, in 1918, a copy of the report as well as the reply from Hindenburg's staff, reports that Cleinow described Haynt as a "nationalist" newspaper, and remarked that the Yiddish press was managed by unzuverlässig (unreliable, untrustworthy) Litvaks and that Haynt wrote "the meanest lies and calumnies" about the German army. The reply suggested that he took resolute measures against the dailythe best solution possibly being for him to launch a Yiddish paper of his own, in Warsaw, and ensure it the largest promulgation possible. 40 Considered a 'pledged pro-German magazine', one which supported KfdO's policies in Poland, the paper reportedly received 200,000 marks of a subsidy. 41 The editorial in the fi rst issue declared:
We are unconditionally loyal towards the Polish nation. What is more, we recognise, with no subterfuge, the Polish nature of this country and have the highest regard for the upstanding Polish culture. Yet, we shall demand that the rights of the ethnic minority, the one that we really are, be respected. We shall endeavour, earnestly and openly, to render the Polish-Jewish relations improved, whilst we believe that it is not assimilatory manners that might ameliorate these relations. … it is only upon the footing of justice and equality that better, human, Polish-Jewish relations may develop. though a lesser-than-usual number of journalists coped well with editing the daily paper whose volume was reduced in the wartime to a mere four pages, the Varshaver Tageblat, once emerged, doubtlessly posed a competitive threat to any journal. Not only its strong team of publicists reinforced its position: its infrastructure, fed with Cleinow's money, did the job well enough. Within less than a fortnight of its opening, Tageblat was distributed to all the larger cities in the GG of Warsaw (later, the reach was extended to the GeneralGovernorate of Lublin). A single issue of Tageblat cost 5 pfennig, which was one pfennig cheaper than the charge for a Haynt. Those who paid the subscription for Tageblat for the year 1916 were promised a whole heap of bonuses: an interesting potpourri of works of Yehoyesh, Arthur Schnitzler, Émile Zola, Eliza Orzeszkowa, and Leo Tolstoy, along with a 'portrait of Jewish writers, poets, and journalists', and a map of Europe. 45 At that moment, Haynt could only offer its subscribers E. N. Frenk's book A History of Jews in Poland 46 as a bonus, although in October and November 1915 its editors made noticeable efforts to increase the newspaper's attractiveness: more advertisements and announcements were published, instalment novels printed, the afternoon edition issued again, and important articles announced.
The key question that made headlines in all the newspapers at the time was a school system regulatory act made effective by the German authorities in September 1915. Under the new law, German and Polish were made the obligatory languages taught at Jewish elementary schools. 47 This caused a stir in the milieu of Jewish nationalists; the everlasting debate reopened over the language to be considered Hebrew is a repository of our cultural treasures; it is within Hebrew that the source lies of our national specifi city, our morality, and knowledge. This is why every national Jew [natsyonaler yid], or even, just a Jew who belongs to the nation [folk] and wishes the nation to subsist, must endorse this scheme and put forth the demand for a possibly big number of hours of Hebrew taught at public [i.e., elementary] schools. 49 Finally, German was accommodated as the language of instruction at some Jewish schools; elsewhere, Yiddish, pretending to be a 'German dialect', was employed. 50 Aleksander Kraushar wrote scornfully of the trend: "This jargon, being a spoiled German language, was accepted by the unenlightened Jewish rabble, corrupt by the Russians and with support from the Litvak element, for their mean schools as the language of instruction." 51 In contrast to Varshaver Tageblat, Haynt unceasingly contended with the German censorship (as did the other periodicals, not under Cleinow's control). In September 1915, exactly the moment the fi rst issue of Tageblat was published, editorial teams received from the Press Board a circular which read: "The incidents of jargon periodicals disturbing the home peace [Burgfrieden] by partly ungrounded attacks on the Polish populace are proliferating. In the event that, with this circular letter having been received, spiteful articles against Poles continue to be published in these periodicals, I shall thence seek to 48 53 -the offi cial reason being the will to facilitate the work of the censors, who, purportedly, could not fl uently read in Yiddish. Jewish journalists could guess that the actual point behind it was to accustom the readers to the German language, which was to gradually replace Yiddish. 54 Konrad Olchowicz Jr., editor of the leading Polish daily Kurier Warszawski, observed that there was not much difference between Russian and German censors:
For the press, the change brought-about was the most directly refl ected in the transition from the embrace of Russian censorship into the no-lesscaring hug of its German peer. The character of this occurrence, which we essentially perceived as jumping out of the frying pan into the fi re, is well illuminated by a handwritten remark made by a German censor on the margin of one of the fi rst rough-proof ever sent to the German censors. In spite, though, of this humorous reassurance of a German censor, you could afford in print certainly not anything, and very little in fact, even if you made the best of your prudence. … the German censorship sieve turned out to be no less dense and tight than, previously, the Russian one. 55 Ber Kutsher, a journalist with Haynt, was of the same opinion: "There were days when more than a half of the material submitted was crossed-out by the censors, in its entirety or in part." 56 55 Konrad Olchowicz, Ćwierć wieku z 'Kurierem Warszawskim' (Kraków, 1974), 62-3. Ferdynand Hoesick was of a similar opinion: "… gradually, also they [i.e., the German censors -note by J.N.-K.] followed, soon afterwards, the practical example of their Russian predecessors, the only difference being that the Germans were more zealous and smarter, which means, more sophisticated (even in bribetaking a Der Moment contributor, made acquaintance with the censors of Yiddish press in Warsaw: Stein, 'a typical German Junker', and Arnold, Lutheran pastor: "Both … were agents of the German secret police and informed it on the Jewish press and Jewish journalists. Both could manage written Yiddish and could understand the language well."
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The rebellious press lent itself easily to various sorts of chicanery. As an anonymous memorial stated:
The Press Board has not shied away from bribing the press-men and individuals. One powerful means of corruption is rendering the paper supplies for dailies conditional upon their political line. Mr. Cleinow prevents paper supplies from reaching Warsaw; the editorial boards are only allowed to fetch [some paper] by his intermediation (may it be added that Mr. Cleinow charges very big prices for the paper, almost twice as high as the previous charges …). Mr. Cleinow furthermore keeps the press dependent upon him by furnishing it with dispatch-messages (the thrifty entrepreneur never neglecting minding his own business as he bars the daily newspapers from publishing special supplements announcing pieces of news of importance, so as to prevent competition to such extras issued by his own newspaper).
58
Records repeatedly tell us about Cleinow's actions interpreted as "dirty competition pursued by a privileged entrepreneur"; 59 this might have been the main reason why Mendl Mozes set up a private press agency, in November 1915 in Warsaw, named Biuro Wiadomości Dziennikarskich (Journalist News Bureau), meant to supply the Jewish press. 60 Otherwise, access to news concerning local events tended to pose problems: for example, at a party for the press people held at Warsaw's Bristol Hotel relative to the proclamation of the 5 November 1916 Act, the only Jewish journalists invited were Varshaver Tageblat's Lazar Kahan and his brother Israel Kahan of Lodzer Folksblat. reportedly, refused to publish materials received from Cleinow, which implied severe fi nancial consequences, almost leading the newspaper to bankruptcy. 62 But this did not mark an end of their troubles with competitors. III 
RELIGION, OR NATIONALITY?
The aforesaid proclamation called ' Act of 5 November' signalled a turn in the German policy toward Poland. It also marked a changed attitude to the Polish Jewry: winning the Jews over for the German cause was no more as important as co-opting the Poles. The authorities consequently came to the conclusion that Varshaver Tageblat would be of no use anymore: "… in certain Jewish-German circles that are fearing the strengthening Jewish nationalism and Jewish emigration to Germany, an action was initiated against the periodical's nationalistic militancy", an anonymous, pretty well-informed contributor to Piotrków-based Wiadomości Polskie wrote. 63 The last issue of the Tageblat, dated 31 January 1917, informed that the journal was to be suspended in order to give way to a new one. 64 This procedure, imposed by the authorities, is said to have aroused criticism "across the segments of Poland's population".
A new daily, entitled Dos Yudishe Vort, set up in February 1917, came in lieu of Varshaver Tageblat. The newspaper was endorsed by "two fanatically pious Jews, in the nature of the Frankfurt-style godly Orthodox", 66 namely, Pinhas Kohn and Emanuel Carlebach, German fi eld rabbis. The idea of publishing a daily paper for masses of Orthodox Jews in Polish lands fi rst appeared in German Orthodox milieus in autumn 1914. 67 The rabbis also initiated the establishment of Agudat ha-Ortodoksim, known afterwards as the Agudat Israel (Agudas Yisroel) -a new political party of Orthodox Jews, which at its founding convention in November 1916 had 17,000 members. As an expert in Aguda's history remarks, "Polish orthodoxy turned to politics not to preserve a dwindling minority group, as in Germany, but to provide a spokesman for a hitherto silent majority". 68 It seemed that an own daily paper would best act as 'spokesman', but the reality turned more complex. Tzaddik Abraham Mordechai Alter of Ger (Góra Kalwaria), whose support was sought by German rabbis, was not completely enthusiastic about Orthodox Jews reading the press, even if a newspaper would itself be Orthodox. While he encouraged the subscription of Dos Yudishe Vort, he remarked in an open letter to his followers: "One ought not to infer that I consider it an obligation to read some newspaper. If a Jew reads no newspapers and remains preoccupied with the Torah only, it is a very good and salutary thing."
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It is hard to tell how many Jews might have obeyed their tzaddik at this particular point; what we are told, though, is that the daily, fi lled with "articles of German rabbis and scholars, being not quite easy reading", proliferated in 10,000 copies.
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Haynt and Der Moment were perfectly aware of the threat posed to them by the newspaper whose reach extended to a so-far-neglected segment of the reader market, and whose publishers were free of fi nancial problems. A counteroffensive was launched immediately; as rabbi Carlebach bitterly put it in a private letter:
What these Zionist and nationalistic beasts, who have been holding a monopoly for the press as a whole, do and write against the Yudishe Vort and how much worry there is about the labour, is unbelievable. Articles and malicious remarks in their organs would have been pretty complimentary for us if there hadn't been the necessity (which we have always dodged) of getting entangled in polemics which are pursued otherwise than in the cultural countries. Clearly, the German-Jewish newspapers also informed in a tendentious [and] ribs, among others: The roundsmen delivering papers for the subscribers -surely, those small brats -were bribed, so the 300 subscribers for whom those boys had been dispensed the paper simply didn't receive a single copy over the whole day. The paper deliverers in the street were bribed so they replied, if enquired, that Yud[ishe] Vort has ceased being issued, or the like thing. In the province, with no-one there who would be able to explain and defend our rights, they act even more brazenly: the copies sent over were simply robbed from the boxes, so nobody fi nally received their copy of the paper. 71 The main arena of confl ict between the periodicals of 'national' Jews and the new, 'orthodox' daily was the defi ning of Jews in ethnic/ national categories. 15 November 1916 saw the occupational authorities publish an ordinance establishing a 'Jewish Religious Community' in the Governorate-General of Warsaw. 72 Recognising the Jews as a 'religious group' and rendering their communities denominational, rather than offering them a status of national-and-cultural autonomy units, expectedly triggered criticism from Haynt, along with the concern that lack of autonomy would cause adverse consequences for the Jews in Poland, once it re-emerges as a state. In an article entitled Di frayhayt fun gevisn, Aron Einhorn noticed that (insofar as the fear of equal rights for Jews was, to a considerable degree, a fear of economic competition) the fear of being given a national and cultural autonomy ensued from the disinclination of the Poles to recognise that Poland was the Jews' own country as well. Whilst admitting that religion was once the determinant of Jewishness, Einhorn remarked that the times have now changed:
The Yiddish language, the Yiddish literature, the Yiddish education is not a whim of some individuals who are willing to pursue their political purposes through it. It is a form of our socio-cultural life, one of the manifestations of our inner national conscience that is alive and is burning within every Jew. Whoever lay his hand on all this, thusly he makes an attempt on our In general, however, Haynt had a rather limited room for manoeuvre left. Indeed, its editors mocked at the Dos Yudishe Vort's advertising brochure which promised golden mountains to the Jews. 74 It is true that Yatskan no less ironically wrote of the closedown of Tageblat, jeering its editorial board's farewell article which stated that the paper's team should take credit for having raised the ethnic, or national, awareness of Polish Jewry. 75 Nonetheless, Haynt would not publish as many hectoring polemics, or critiques as open, as those appearing, for instance, on the occasion of the Fourth Duma election carried out in Warsaw in 1912. 76 Instead, the newspaper confi ned itself to somewhat maliciously commenting on some articles, limiting this to the section 'In unzer veltl' ('In our circle') and thus as if suggesting that those were internal affairs of the journalist milieu. This might have ensued from the actions taken by the German censors (if not, additionally, from the editors' self-censorship). Another possible reason was that the winter and early spring of 1917 were marked by the formation of a new Jewish party, called Folkspartay ('People's Party') and run by Noyekh Pryłucki. 77 Judging by the numerous enunciations, the Haynt milieu was preoccupied by this issue to a much greater extent than by the actions of the Orthodox party: Pryłucki's political activities posed a threat that Der Moment, the periodical he co-edited, would defi nitely be ranked fi rst amongst the newspapers deemed to represent a Jewish national point of view and the politically aware Jewish masses. 78 A thorn in the side of both dailies was, doubtlessly, the fact that Carlebach and Kohn highlighted the loyalty of the Orthodox Jews with respect to Polish interests. 79 A correspondent with Wiadomości Polskie in 1917 described Dos Yudishe Vort thus: "The magazine fi ghts the nationalistic and separatist tendencies, strives for harmonious coexistence between the Jews and the Polish society. … The periodical is edited meticulously, the articles therein published being imbued with a sense of responsibility. The entire Jewish press has opposed it, since Dos Yudishe Vort has proved courageous enough to come out against the machinations of peasant party activists and the utopias of the Zionists." 80 1918 saw the German-Jewish press reveal a private memorandum of rabbi Pinhas Kohn, which characterised the specifi ed circles of Polish Jews based on their disposition to cooperate in political terms. The memorandum regarded the Orthodox the easiest controllable group, the Zionists being the toughest to control. A separate category, 'destructive element', was coined for the Litvaks, 81 which certainly refl ected the bad experiences of the German rabbis: with the Germans eventually leaving Warsaw, and in the face of the ever-worsening fi nancial situation of Dos Yudishe Vort, they resolved, in February 1919, that the daily be closed down.
V CONCLUSION brochure La question polono-juive d'après un juif polonais and an article by Wolfgang Heinze, published by the Preussische Jahrbücher (both of 1916), ranked among the most important such publications. An assimilated Polish Jew, Lauer accused the Yiddish press of having aroused hatred towards Poles among the Jewish masses, and concluded: "These weeds could only have grown in the heavy climate of Russian dominance … . It was only under these completely abnormal conditions that a press like that could … terrorise the people whose interests it allegedly defended." 83 Wolfgang Heinze, author of probably the fi rst article focused solely on the Yiddish press in the Polish territory and published in the German press during the war, criticised Lauer's approach, for a change, deeming it overly negative. With no elementary-level universal education offer present (other than heders), Heinze emphasised the didactic role of Jewish press, naming it a 'Yiddish school for adults' (die jiddische Schule der Erwachsenen) 84 . Referring to the aforementioned Haynt's article by Stupnicki about Yiddish as a language having its own literature (Literatursprache), he concluded: "The visits I paid to the editorial offi ces of Warsaw Yiddish magazines have made me convinced that their editors I encountered proved to be ones whose educational background well bore comparison with some of their European colleagues." 85 Reports and articles published by German-Jewish periodicals dealt at times with Litvak-related threads. For instance, Otto von Zwiedineck tried to persuade the readers of the Neue Jüdische Monatshefte that the development of the Jewish national movement in Polish lands did not come in consequence of the infl ow of Litvaks, whom he otherwise (not quite consistently, in fact) termed 'General-Staff offi cers for the national movement' (die Generalstabsoffi ziere für die nationale Bewegung). 86 KfdO activists, having met some representatives of Yiddish press on one of their trips to Warsaw, reported later on that "[i]n many respects the Yiddish press was well in advance of offi cial Jewish bodies in expressing the wishes of the Jewish population. … more unity and desire not to give in to Polish pressure were observed at a meeting with representatives of the press than at similar meetings with other Jewish leaders." 87 No doubt, the years of German occupation solidifi ed the hegemony of the Yiddish press as a guard of Jewish interests and consciences. Having regard to the politicisation extending to the Orthodox strata of the Jewish community, it seems that the press as such conclusively won the battle, becoming an inseparable element in the life of every Jew, regardless of his (or her) political convictions.
